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Po l i c y B r i e f
Noncitizens in the U.S. Military
N av i g a t i n g N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o n c e r n s a n d R e c r u i t m e n t N e e d s
By Muzaffar Chishti, Austin Rose, and Stephen Yale-Loehr
May 2019

Executive Summary
Foreign nationals have served in the U.S. military throughout American history. Indeed, in
many chapters in U.S. history, they have been encouraged to serve with the promise of expedited avenues for naturalization. However, in recent years, noncitizens have faced increasing
hurdles to serving their new country. Citing national security concerns, Congress and the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) have introduced a series of policies that significantly increase
the vetting requirements for noncitizen military recruits and modify the processes by which
they are trained and given a chance to naturalize. These new policies have limited the enlistment of noncitizen soldiers, delayed their training and naturalization, and inhibited them
from fully contributing in-demand skills to the U.S. military.

Close examination of the history and contemporary role of noncitizens in the U.S. military led
to the following findings:
Noncitizens have been serving in the U.S. military since the Revolutionary War. Many have
obtained citizenship through their service.
 In the past 100 years, more than 760,000 noncitizens have enlisted and obtained
U.S. citizenship through military service. Naturalizations of this kind are generally highest in times of war, with peaks during and after World Wars I and II, and a
smaller but steady increase since September 11, 2001.

 In 2015, close to 8,000 noncitizens were in the active-duty Army, representing 1.6
percent of the Army’s enlisted force. The number of foreign-born servicemembers is
much higher, as it includes many who have gained U.S. citizenship since enlisting.
 More than 10,000 noncitizens have entered the military through a DOD program
called Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) that was launched
in 2008. About 900 of these recruits are beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which was created by the Obama administration in 2012 to grant temporary deportation reprieves and work permits to certain
unauthorized immigrants brought to the United States before age 16.

New rules implemented by DOD regarding
the nature and timeline of background checks
have kept thousands of noncitizens from going
to basic training and beginning their military
service.
 Recent estimates suggest that about
1,000 recruits from the MAVNI program are waiting for their background
checks to be completed. And as of May
2017, more than 1,000 MAVNI recruits had seen their temporary visas
expire or otherwise fallen out of legal
status while waiting, leaving them
vulnerable to deportation.
 Since September 2016, more than 500
noncitizen military personnel have
been abruptly discharged from their
respective military branches.

The U.S. military has pressing needs for expertise in critical languages, health care, and cyber
skills. Noncitizens are well positioned to help
fill these skill gaps.
 The U.S. military is struggling to meet
its recruitment goals. For example, the
Army fell 10,000 recruits short of its
initial recruitment goal of 80,000 in
fiscal year 2018.
 The population of lawful permanent
residents (also known as greencard holders) who met the baseline
requirements for military service
was roughly 1.2 million in 2011; this
does not include other noncitizens
who may have been eligible through
MAVNI. As of 2016, about 690,000
nonimmigrants between ages 18 and
24 were residing in the United States.
The majority of those have temporary
visas that qualify them for military
service.
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 Noncitizen military personnel tend
to have higher education levels than
their U.S.-citizen peers and frequently
outperform them on military testing. The attrition rate for noncitizens

in the U.S. military is also more than
10 percentage points lower than for
citizens, meaning that noncitizens are
more likely to serve in the military for
extended periods of time.

Noncitizens are not, nor are they likely to become, a primary means of meeting the staffing
needs of the armed services. Yet particularly
in a time of recruitment shortages, noncitizen
servicemembers with in-demand qualifications
and skills can make valuable contributions.
The U.S. government should consider reviving
the MAVNI program, establishing more efficient vetting procedures that do not unnecessarily delay new recruits, and updating the
program’s qualifying characteristics to include
cyber skills—a skillset becoming ever more
essential to modern militaries. In short, while
thoroughly screening recruits is an important
element of protecting U.S. national security, so
too is ensuring a fully staffed and highly skilled
fighting force.

I.

Introduction

Noncitizens have fought for the United States
throughout its history. They have served in
especially large numbers during wartime and
periods of national crisis. For much of American history, the U.S. military has regarded
noncitizens as an asset, offering expedited U.S.
citizenship to legal permanent residents and
other noncitizens upon enlistment.

Yet in recent years, the military has come to
see noncitizens as less of an asset and more of
a risk. Programs and procedures that facilitate
noncitizen enlistment have been rolled back,
and the vetting requirements for noncitizen
military personnel have intensified. These new
policies have created such significant delays
that most noncitizens who have enlisted in the
past two years are still waiting to be trained or
have been abruptly discharged. Some are also
facing deportation.
A series of memos issued by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and individual military
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branches since September 2016 make evident
that heightened vetting in noncitizen recruitment is based on national security concerns.
Statements reference concerns about the
prospect of noncitizens conspiring with their
home-country governments to infiltrate the U.S.
military. DOD has applied particular scrutiny
to the Military Accessions Vital to the National
Interest (MAVNI) program, through which
certain noncitizens without lawful permanent
resident status (also known as a green card) are
recruited to fill positions in the major military
branches. Recent incidents of suspicious behavior and visa fraud appear to be the impetus for
the military’s concerns, but it is unclear whether
those concerns merit the introduction of policies
that have effectively halted the MAVNI program.
Even as recent policies have made it more
difficult for noncitizens to serve, the need to
recruit qualified noncitizens who can help the
U.S. military meet pressing skill and enlistment
needs is as great as ever. The language, cultural,
and health-care skills for which noncitizens have
historically been recruited remain essential to
the military’s optimal performance. While the
military is understandably attempting to protect
U.S. national security by keeping out dangerous
noncitizens, that same national security may be
threatened if noncitizens are barred from serving.

This policy brief details recent changes in military policy toward noncitizens and provides an
assessment of their impact on current and future U.S. military needs. First, the brief summarizes the history of immigrant contributions to
the military and examines the ways in which the
United States has traditionally balanced national
security concerns with the need for qualified
personnel. Second, the brief shows how national
security considerations have recently motivated
the military to increase vetting and change
naturalization procedures for noncitizens, preventing thousands from starting their military
service and leaving some vulnerable to deportation. The brief concludes by identifying military
needs that could be filled by removing barriers
to or expanding recruitment of noncitizens without sacrificing national security.

II. History of Noncitizens in the
U.S. Military
Noncitizens have been eligible to enlist in
the U.S. military since the earliest days of the
country. Providing incentives for noncitizens to
join is as old as the practice of recruiting them.
Congress first expedited naturalization of noncitizens serving in the military during the War
of 1812. An 1813 law allowed noncitizens to
become U.S. citizens immediately upon entering military service if they declared an intent to
naturalize.1

During the Civil War, the Union passed several
laws that aimed to increase its forces by enlisting noncitizens. An 1862 law allowed noncitizens who enlisted the opportunity to become
citizens upon being honorably discharged (even
if they had not indicated beforehand their intention to become citizens) and waived a one-year
residency requirement.2 The Conscription Act
of 1863 built upon this foundation by drafting
into the Union’s armed forces “all able-bodied
male citizens . . . and persons of foreign birth
who shall have declared on oath their intention
to become citizens.”3 In the debates surrounding
the 1863 law, legislators argued that because the
U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to
create a uniform rule of naturalization, it had the
power to establish an expedited path to naturalization for those who serve in the armed forces.4
The concept of expedited naturalization through
military service reemerged during World War
I. The National Defense Act of 1916 allowed
noncitizens to serve in the U.S. military so long
as they declared their intention to become U.S.
citizens.5 A 1918 law then opened an expedited
path to naturalization for noncitizens serving in
the military by removing or modifying in certain
cases the requirements that applicant first reside in the country for a certain number of years
and that they declare their intention to become
a citizen before applying to do so.6 In discussing
the 1918 law, senators emphasized that a large
portion of the U.S. Army, consisting of more than
123,000 noncitizen soldiers, should not be sent
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to fight in a war overseas without the legislation
first being passed.7 This national security issue
necessitated that Congress act quickly to enable
noncitizen soldiers to become citizens.

After World War I, Congress passed several naturalization acts that expedited naturalization for
noncitizen members of the military.8 Congress
passed similar laws during and after World War
II as well.9

In 1952, Congress codified existing immigration and naturalization laws by enacting the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Communism was the focus of intense concern, and
Congress feared allowing “subversives” into the
military. Yet there were also clear reasons to
allow and even encourage noncitizens to serve.
For example, a representative from the Japanese
American Citizen Association testified at a congressional hearing about the bravery of Japanese
American soldiers during World War II, saying,
“No other unit in American military history, for
its size and length of combat, won as many decorations or suffered as many casualties.”10
In recognition of the value noncitizens can bring
to the U.S. military, Congress enacted two provisions in the INA that continued to allow non-

citizens who served to naturalize more quickly
than other noncitizens. Although most legal
permanent residents (LPRs) must wait three to
five years after getting a green card before they
can naturalize, Section 328 of the INA states
that during peacetime, noncitizens can apply to
become U.S. citizens after serving in the military
for one year. In times of war or national crisis,
Section 329 of the INA allows noncitizens to
naturalize immediately upon enlisting. Both
sections also waive some other naturalization
requirements, such as the minimum physical presence in the country and the minimum
length of residence in the state from which
the noncitizen is applying. Since 1952, almost
300,000 noncitizens have naturalized through
military service.11
Thus, providing the means for incorporating
noncitizens into the U.S. military—and, in times
of need, actively encouraging their enlistment—
is a long-standing tradition. Since at least the
Civil War, expedited naturalization has been the
norm during periods of war. And since at least
1952, this has also been true in peacetime. Figure 1 illustrates the number of noncitizens who
gained U.S. citizenship via military service over
the past century.

Figure 1. Annual Number of Military Naturalizations, Fiscal Years 1918–2017
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www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
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III. Noncitizens in the Modern
U.S. Military
After the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the U.S. military extended service eligibility to a broader range of noncitizens and provided new incentives for noncitizens to enlist,
while simultaneously formalizing the rules for
noncitizen enlistment.

In 2002, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13269, which defined the newly
initiated War on Terror as a national crisis,
thereby triggering Section 329 of the INA and
allowing green-card holders to naturalize immediately after enlistment.12 The 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act13 limited enlistment
in the military to U.S. citizens and LPRs, codifying a requirement that had already been widely
exercised by the military. Yet it also included a
provision allowing other noncitizens to enlist “if
the Secretary of Defense determines that such
enlistment is vital to the national interest.”14
This provision served as the basis for DOD’s creation of the MAVNI program in 2008.15
The MAVNI program allows noncitizens with
specialized language skills or health-care expertise to enlist in the U.S. military, either in active
duty or in the Reserves. Asylees, refugees, and
most nonimmigrant visa holders qualify for the
program as long as they have maintained their
legal status for two years or more.
The primary purpose of the MAVNI program is
to fill specific military shortages and to meet
overall recruitment goals.16 Initially put forward as a one-year pilot program with a cap
of 1,000 enlistees, MAVNI gradually expanded
to allow for 5,200 annual recruits in fiscal year
(FY) 2016.17 Since the program began in 2008,
more than 10,400 noncitizens have enlisted, the
majority in the active-duty Army or the Army
Reserves.18 MAVNI recruits have served in a
wide range of roles, such as interpreter aides,
combat engineers, medical specialists, and Special Operations fighters.19 In 2014, the Obama
administration extended MAVNI eligibility to

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
recipients—unauthorized immigrants who were
brought to the country as children and, after
meeting criteria, gained temporary relief from
deportation and work authorization. About 900
DACA recipients have since joined.20

Most MAVNI recruits have qualified for the program based on their ability to speak one of the
50 critical languages identified in the eligibility
criteria, such as Arabic, Chinese, and Hindi. By
contrast, of the 1,303 recruits in FY 2013, only
101 were health-care professionals.21 However,
a 2014 Army directive reserved a minimum of
10 percent of its MAVNI slots for health-care
professionals.22 Further DOD guidance issued in
2016 limits language-based recruitments to 10
percent of each branch’s Reserves and mandates
that no more than 10 percent can be recruited
for any single critical language.23
After MAVNI recruits enlist, they typically follow
an expedited naturalization pathway. Because
Bush’s 2002 executive order remains in effect,
MAVNI recruits can theoretically become citizens almost immediately after they enlist.

Noncitizens—both LPRs and MAVNI recruits—
have made important contributions to the
military since 9/11. In 2015, close to 8,000 enlisted noncitizens were in the active-duty Army,
representing 1.6 percent of the Army’s enlisted
force.24 Between September 2001 and December
2015, noncitizens conducted more than 30,000
overseas deployments. The actual number is
likely higher since an additional 20,000 deployments during the period were conducted by
persons whose citizenship was unknown, many
of whom were likely foreign born.25 Between
September 2001 and the end of 2013, almost
300 foreign-born soldiers died in combat.26

IV. Noncitizens as a National
Security Risk
After actively expanding noncitizens’ eligibility
to enlist throughout the early 2000s, the U.S.
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military has begun narrowing pathways into its
ranks due to national security concerns. Between September 2016 and October 2017, DOD
issued a series of memos identifying security
risks associated with noncitizen military personnel and establishing new guidelines for their
deployment and naturalization (see Section V
for more details). Together, these memos have
effectively suspended the MAVNI program and
made it exceedingly difficult for noncitizens to
serve in the military.

MAVNI was suspended temporarily in 2014 to
allow for the implementation of new screening
standards after the Obama administration announced that DACA recipients would be eligible
to participate. But the program was quickly
resumed,27 as the suspension was based primarily on logistical concerns. By contrast, the more
recent memos raise national security concerns.
An internal DOD memo from May 2017 states
that MAVNI recruits present several security
risks based on their “higher risk of connections
to foreign intelligence services” and “proximity
to the force and sensitive information.”28

The decision to block access to enlistment
appears to be the result of recent events and
discoveries that provoked suspicion of foreign
infiltration of the U.S. military. In April 2016, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
arrested two Army recruits who had established eligibility for MAVNI through a fraudulent
student visa scheme.29 In August 2017, a classified report from the DOD Office of Inspector
General identified “potential security risks” in
the MAVNI program.30 Two other reports, commissioned by the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence in 2016 and 2018, identified similar
risks among LPR servicemembers.31 According
to a recent affidavit in a federal lawsuit, many
noncitizen recruits failed to disclose information
about their foreign contacts and former military
service in another country that could prevented
them from enlisting. Others were allegedly
engaging in suspicious behavior, such as seeking
access to classified information and attempting
to sabotage equipment.32

V. Enhanced Vetting for
Noncitizens
Driven by heightened national security concerns, DOD has worked with U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to significantly
enhance the background checks for noncitizen
military recruits and to modify the timeline
for their training and naturalization. Before
September 2016, noncitizen military personnel—whether MAVNI recruits or LPRs—would
typically enlist and train like any other soldier
and undergo vetting for naturalization like any
other noncitizen.
Upon enlistment, all prospective U.S. military
recruits must submit their fingerprints and go
through a standard criminal background check.
In the past, both citizens and noncitizens were
able to ship to basic training while these checks
were pending. After just one day of qualifying
service, such as participation in a drill, noncitizens were eligible to receive a “certification
of honorable service” from their respective
military branch allowing them to apply for
citizenship.33 Assuming that no disqualifying
information was discovered in the background
check, noncitizens could then promptly naturalize at a USCIS office located on the military base,
completing the same requirements as civilian
applicants for citizenship but on an expedited
timeline.34

New policies have stalled the process. A DOD
memo issued on September 30, 2016, reauthorized the MAVNI program but established
enhanced vetting requirements for MAVNI
recruits.35 The policy obligates MAVNI enlistees
to pass four different background checks, including the same “Tier 5” investigation required for
Top Secret security clearances.36 Similar, though
slightly less rigorous, checks were established in
2017 for LPRs.37 Under the new regime, noncitizen recruits seeking entry-level military jobs
must undergo vetting that is far more substantial than their citizen counterparts and in some
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cases equivalent to military officers seeking
high-level promotions.

On October 13, 2017, DOD issued a series of
memos formalizing the new vetting standards
and ordering the military branches to withhold the “certification of honorable service”
form (called an N-426) from all noncitizen
recruits until they complete basic training and
at least 180 days of active duty or, for those in
the Reserves, one year of service.38 The memos
also barred noncitizens from deploying to basic
training until their background checks were
completed. For MAVNI recruits, Congress subsequently codified this change in the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019.39 For
LPRs, the hold on deployment was enjoined by a
federal court in California in November 2018.40

The new requirements have prevented noncitizen recruits from starting their military
service. While the California court injunction
enables LPRs to ship to basic training while their
background checks are pending, MAVNI recruits
are forced to wait in limbo for what can amount
to years. The mandatory Tier 5 checks take an
average of 400 days to complete, and this is in
addition to the time needed for the other three
checks.41 Recent estimates indicate that roughly
1,000 MAVNI recruits are waiting for clearance.42
The new rules not only prevent soldiers from
beginning basic training, but also delay access to
citizenship for those already engaged in active
service. Applications for military naturalization fell from 3,132 in the fourth quarter of FY
201743 to 644 in the third quarter of FY 2018,44
likely due to the new prerequisites for receiving an N-426 certification established by the
October 2017 memos. Many noncitizens who
received N-426 certifications before the new
guidance have seen their certifications revoked
and their citizenship applications placed on
hold.45 And data released by USCIS show that
in the first quarter of FY 2019, military applications for citizenship were denied at a higher
rate than those filed by civilians—16.6 percent
versus 11.2 percent, respectively.46 Without citizenship, many noncitizens are unable to serve in

the positions for which they were recruited, for
example, as military linguists.47

Some enlisted noncitizens have been discharged
from the military during this waiting period. A
May 2017 DOD memo suggested canceling the
enlistment contracts of approximately 4,000
MAVNI recruits who had not yet been trained
or naturalized.48 While the Pentagon has denied
formally ordering this cancellation, there have
been numerous reports of MAVNI recruits being
abruptly discharged without explanation.49 According to unsealed court records, 502 MAVNI
recruits were discharged between July 2017 and
July 2018.50 After a federal lawsuit challenged
the discharges, the Army announced in August
2018 that it had reinstated more than 30 MAVNI
soldiers and halted the discharge of an additional 149.51 However, an internal Army email obtained by the New York Times instructed officials
to reexamine MAVNI recruits’ files to identify
alternative grounds for discharge.52
The new DOD policy also places some noncitizens at risk of deportation. Generally, a MAVNI
recruit’s eligibility for enlistment is based on
some form of temporary legal status, such as a
student visa or DACA status. As of May 2017,
more than 1,000 recruits had fallen out of status
while waiting for basic training.53 Such numbers will surely continue to rise if these policies
remain in place.

DOD has assured MAVNI recruits that they will
not be deported while they wait for basic training or if they have been honorably discharged.54
Consistent with this statement, USCIS has a
policy for granting deferred action or parole-inplace to MAVNI recruits. Such protections would
shield soldiers from deportation and provide
work authorization.55
However, a USCIS report published in 2018
clarified that certain MAVNI recruits who have
already completed basic training may not be
eligible for deferred action.56 In fact, the USCIS
Ombudsman found that many applications by
MAVNI recruits for deferred action had been
denied or placed on hold without explanation.57
Additionally, some MAVNI recruits have re-
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ceived an “uncharacterized discharge,” leaving
them outside of the specified group of military
personnel DOD promised to protect.58 Finally,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has started removal proceedings against at
least one former MAVNI soldier, even though he
received an honorable discharge.59
Another blow to the MAVNI program came in
August 2018, when President Donald Trump
signed the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 into law. The law requires
all MAVNI recruits to use the “critical skill or
expertise” for which they were recruited in
their “primary daily duties . . . as a member of
the armed forces.”60 But most jobs as military
doctors or linguists require U.S. citizenship,61
which MAVNI recruits cannot obtain until they
pass their lengthy background checks and serve
for 180 days or more. Whereas MAVNI recruits
have previously been permitted to serve in
positions outside of their specific expertise—either temporarily while they wait for citizenship
or in some cases indefinitely62—the new law
forecloses that option. This leaves only a few
low-level positions, such as interpreter aid jobs,
available to MAVNI recruits.63 Thus, the FY 2019
law renders the MAVNI program effectively
defunct. While it allocates 1,000 MAVNI slots to
each of the military branches, the new statutory
requirements and enhanced vetting standards
make it very unlikely that those slots will be
filled.

As the hold on training for LPRs remains
blocked by a federal court and the enhanced
vetting procedures for MAVNI recruits face
continued legal challenges, DOD is developing
a policy that would require all military recruits
with any “foreign nexus” to be screened before
shipping to basic training. Like the October
2017 memos, DOD officials cite national security
concerns as the rationale for this new policy.
The new procedure could potentially delay the
training of thousands of recruits, including LPRs,
dual citizens, and U.S. citizens with foreign-born
spouses or family members.64 As of March 2019,
the policy was still in a “pre-decisional state,” as

DOD officials continued to debate the efficiency
and necessity of additional screening.65

In sum, by limiting enlistment and implementing new vetting procedures, the U.S. government
is attempting to balance the benefits of noncitizen military service with the potential risks
to national security. While acknowledging that
programs such as MAVNI fill “critical manpower
gaps and operational requirements,” DOD believes that the new measures are “necessary to
ensure the security, success, and sustainability
of the MAVNI program.”66
In practice, the new standards have severely
restricted the ability of noncitizens to serve the
United States and prevented the military from
using noncitizens’ full potential. The statutory
requirement for daily use of specialized skills
means that many potential MAVNI recruits will
likely not be able to enlist in the first place. And
because of the enhanced vetting requirements,
those who do enlist or have already enlisted will
have to wait years before they can make any
meaningful contributions.
Some in the DOD seem to believe that MAVNI is
not worth the administrative burden of the enhanced screening measures allegedly required
to sustain it. In an internal memo signed in May
2017 and leaked the next month,67 DOD officials proposed terminating the MAVNI program,
arguing that the new screening requirements
have diverted valuable resources that could be
devoted to higher military priorities and that
the measures may not even be sufficient to fully
mitigate the perceived risks associated with the
program.

The military has a compelling interest in keeping dangerous foreign individuals out of their
ranks to preserve U.S. national security. Yet as
the military narrows access for noncitizens, its
needs are growing. An equally compelling national security interest lies in maintaining a fully
staffed and talented fighting force, something
that may be difficult to do without the ability to
enlist noncitizens.
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VI. Noncitizens and Gaps in the
U.S. Military
Although the military is expanding and modernizing, it is struggling to recruit enough people
with key skills. To meet its needs, the military
has tweaked its policies and implemented several initiatives to better recruit and train nativeborn U.S. citizens for military service. Yet these
efforts have largely fallen short, leaving crucial
gaps that could be filled by noncitizens.

A.

Recruitment Shortages

Having steadily shrunk in size since 2011, when
troop levels in Afghanistan were at their peak,
the U.S. military is beginning to grow again. The
2018 National Defense Authorization Act tasked
the Army with enlisting roughly 80,000 activeduty soldiers in FY 2018,68 one of the largest
single-year increases in U.S. history.69 In April
2018, however, the Army’s recruiting command announced that it would lower its goal to
76,500, having recruited only 28,000 soldiers
in the first six months of the fiscal year.70 By the
end of the fiscal year in September, the Army
still fell several thousand recruits short of its
modified goal.71

Military officials cite the strength of the economy as one of the factors inhibiting recruitment,
as young people are less likely to join the military when they have other job options. Of greater concern, recruiters point to the prevalence
within the U.S. population of characteristics that
bar young men and women from military service, such as a lack of sufficient education, health
issues, or criminal histories.72
A 2009 report by the bipartisan Council for a
Strong America found that 75 percent of American youth between ages 17 and 24 were ineligible for military service. Roughly 16 percent did
not have a high school diploma, 10 percent possessed a disqualifying felony or misdemeanor
conviction, and 27 percent were overweight.73
According to a 2018 report by the Heritage

Foundation, the U.S. population’s military readiness has not changed much since 2009. The national high school graduation rate is 84 percent
at best, and 50 percent in some urban areas.74
More than half of young adults between ages 17
and 24 are obese or have other medical issues
preventing them from serving.75

To meet recruitment goals in the face of these
challenges, the U.S. military has enhanced enlistment incentives. The Army spent roughly $600
million on hiring additional recruiters and doling out bonuses to enlistees in 2018, more than
doubling its spending in previous years. The
2019 budget for Army recruiting and advertising is roughly the same, and the 2020 budget
proposal allocates more than $700 million for
that purpose.76

In addition to offering financial incentives, the
Army has lowered its enlistment standards.
The percentage of recruits the Army allows to
join despite scoring in the bottom third on their
entrance exams rose from 0.2 percent in 2013 to
1.9 percent in 2017. The Army also granted 506
waivers to recruits for previous marijuana use in
2017, an increase of more than 300 from 2016.77
According to some military officials, these concessions are necessary to expand and maintain
the military’s fighting force. Others have criticized the decision. One senior officer claimed
that the last time recruitment standards were
lowered, many of the soldiers who just barely
made the cut “eventually caused misconduct
[and] were separated for dishonorable reasons
more than normal soldiers.”78

The pool of potential noncitizen recruits exhibits
significantly different characteristics. In 2011,
the CNA consulting group estimated that the
population of noncitizens who met the baseline
requirements for military service, including
English proficiency and high school education,
was roughly 1.2 million.79 The actual number is
likely much higher, as the CNA estimate included
only LPRs, leaving out a large group of nonimmigrant visa holders. About 690,000 nonimmigrants between ages 18 and 24 were residing in
the United States as of 2016,80 the vast majority
of whom had visas that made them preliminarily
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eligible for the MAVNI program. These noncitizens also possess skills that would fulfill specific
military needs.

B.

Language and Cultural Skills

Tasked with overseeing an ever-increasing and
constantly changing array of conflicts across the
world, the U.S. armed forces have struggled to
enlist people with the necessary language and
cultural skills to engage with local populations.
The demand for such skills increased substantially when the United States started the War on
Terror, sending military personnel to unfamiliar,
non-English-speaking territory.
In 2008, the House Armed Services Committee
issued a report drawing attention to the urgent
language needs of the U.S. military. Cited in that
report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified language and cultural familiarity as “critical warfighting skills” and called for military branches
to “ensure that combat forces deploy with the
essential ability to understand and effectively
communicate with native populations, local and
government officials, and Coalition partners.”81

DOD has invested heavily in foreign language
training in recent years. In 2007, it created a
new program called Project Global Officer, which
works with top-tier universities to provide
intensive language training to students and
funds scholarships for critical language study
abroad.82 In 2010, DOD allocated funding for 96
new foreign affairs officers, a cadre of high-ranking officials across the four military branches
who use their regional expertise to advise on
military strategy. In the same year, DOD received
roughly $550 million for language and cultural
training programs offered to military personnel
at service institutions and military bases before
deployment.83
To date, these efforts have fallen short. A 2011
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
found that “DOD-wide efforts to establish a
planning process that could better align service
training approaches are incomplete.”84 And

despite language and cultural programs, the
U.S. military lacks enough personnel to fill its
language needs. Instead, it must rely heavily
on civilian contract linguists. In 2011, the U.S.
military employed about 5,000 contract linguists
in Iraq alone.85 In 2017, the Army awarded a
$9.86 billion contract to a collection of companies tasked with identifying and placing civilian
interpreters and translators.86
Noncitizens represent an untapped, costeffective resource. The 2011 CNA report found
that “noncitizen recruits are likely to possess
language and cultural skills that are of strategic
interest to the U.S. military.”87 According to CNA,
it takes about two to three years of intense study
for an average English speaker to become fluent in a complicated language such as Arabic.88
Yet most noncitizens can start military service
already possessing native fluency in a language
other than English. Indeed, many potential
noncitizen recruits speak languages that are in
high demand in the military. Of the 1.2 million
noncitizens estimated to be eligible for military
service in 2011, 32 percent (384,000) spoke
African or Asian languages,89 many of which are
listed as critical languages in the MAVNI eligibility guidelines.90 In addition to language fluency,
many noncitizens possess unique cultural skills
that are helpful in connecting with local communities and gathering intelligence in the course of
ground-level counter-insurgency efforts.91

C.

Medical and Health-Care Expertise

The U.S. military also needs medical expertise.
The armed forces operate their own healthcare system, through which they provide care
to military personnel both at home and abroad.
However, the system suffers from shortages and
inefficiencies. A 2018 GAO report found that
there were not nearly enough military physicians to fill the slots mandated by Congress. The
report stated that “[u]ntil the services develop
and implement strategies to alleviate these gaps,
they could be at risk of not being able to provide
medical care to servicemembers during wartime.”92
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The MAVNI program has enabled the military
to recruit noncitizens to “fill medical specialties
wherein the service has a shortfall.”93 The 2018
GAO report called upon the military branches to
develop “targeted strategies” to address gaps in
medical coverage. Recruiting noncitizen medical
professionals, whether LPRs or MAVNI applicants, provides a practical way to do that.

D.

Cyber Skills

Military leaders have long emphasized the
urgent need to develop infrastructure and train
personnel for cyberwarfare to keep pace with
foreign militaries. The Army is in the process of
mobilizing 62 Cyber Mission Force Teams94 and
the Navy currently supervises a U.S. Fleet Cyber
Command of 16,000 personnel tasked with
protecting the military’s computer networks and
telecommunications infrastructure.95
Military recruiters are struggling to recruit and
retain soldiers for cyberwarfare. In a March
2018 congressional hearing, Vice Admiral Michael M. Gilday testified that high salaries in the
private sector are making it difficult to attract
enough people to staff the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command.96 Traditionally, the armed forces have
relied on civilians to fill gaps in the cybersphere.
But military leaders insist that it is essential
to have military personnel with cyber skills as
well. One Special Forces Commander said, “In
the next ten years, every single Green Beret,
SEAL, and Ranger must understand computers,
cryptography, and coding. It is essential to their
survival.”97

Compared to the U.S. population generally,
noncitizens are disproportionately likely to have
computer-related skills and educational training. Of the 340,000 noncitizens who received
or renewed their H-1B nonimmigrant visas in
2016, 69 percent were working in computerrelated occupations, many as coders and IT
specialists.98 The vast majority of H-1B holders
are from India, China, the Philippines, and South
Korea, and many speak critical languages that
meet MAVNI eligibility requirements. Of the 1.18

million international students residing in the
United States on F or M visas as of June 2017,
43 percent (513,000) were studying science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics.99 And
as of April 2018, roughly 136,000 international
students pursuing bachelor’s and master’s degrees were studying computer and information
sciences.100

Large numbers of H-1B holders and foreign students, both groups eligible for MAVNI, possess
the cyber and language skills that are critical to
today’s armed forces. For many of these noncitizens, the opportunity of acquiring citizenship is
an important recruitment tool.

E.

Retention and Performance

Noncitizens are more likely than citizens to
remain in long-term military service. Research
shows that noncitizen soldiers have lower attrition rates than their U.S.-citizen peers. Controlling for factors such as race and socioeconomic
background, studies have found that 18.2 percent of noncitizens leave the military within four
years, compared to 31.9 percent of citizens.101 A
report on the MAVNI program presented to DOD
in 2013 found that MAVNI recruits have low attrition rates similar to those of other noncitizen
servicemembers.102 And 50 percent of MAVNI
recruits surveyed for the report said they wanted to stay in the military until retirement.103

Noncitizen recruits also tend to hold higher
academic qualifications and perform better than
their U.S.-citizen peers. MAVNI recruits have an
average of four more years of education than
non-MAVNI soldiers, their English proficiency is
on par with that of native-born-citizen military
personnel, and they score an average of 17
points higher on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).104 In FY 2016, more than half
of noncitizen military personnel in the armed
forces were considered “high quality,” having
top-level education credentials and scoring in
the top 50 percentile on the AFQT.105 In 2012, a
soldier from Nepal even won the Army Soldier of
the Year award.106
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VII. Recommendations
The needs of the U.S. military and the demands placed upon it by Congress are as great
as ever. Yet as the needs of the military grow,
new policies are inhibiting noncitizen military
service rather than encouraging it. The noncitizen population has not been, nor will it likely
become, a predominant means of meeting the
staffing needs of the armed services. However,
as research has shown, noncitizens bring with
them uniquely valuable qualifications and contributions that have traditionally been sought in
military recruitment and performance.

Since 2016, however, national security concerns
appear to be causing a change of course. DOD
has restricted noncitizens’ access to the military
by enhancing vetting procedures, altering the
service-based naturalization process, and suggesting the termination of the MAVNI program.
While noncitizens are not barred from enlisting, far fewer have been able to serve since
the end of 2016. Furthermore, the new vetting
requirements have placed such a large burden
on military officials that some question whether
noncitizen recruitment is worth the effort.

The following measures could recapture the balance that has traditionally been struck between
national security considerations and noncitizen military service as an important asset for
the military and its role in advancing national
security.

A.

Expand and Update the MAVNI Program

DOD should reform the MAVNI program to
more squarely target the critical and emerging
needs of the U.S. military. While language skills
and health-care expertise are still essential, the
pressing needs for the future are in the cybersphere. The MAVNI program does not currently
provide a pathway to service for the thousands
of noncitizens in the United States with computer skills. Updating the MAVNI program to
include cyber skills as qualifying criteria could

help the military attract talent in a field that is
highly competitive.

Just as the MAVNI program was initially created to fill critical shortages, more MAVNI slots
should be added to help meet the military’s current recruitment goals. For the 10,000 soldiers
the Army was unable to recruit in FY 2018,
there are up to 690,000 noncitizens who may
be eligible to enlist through MAVNI. Given the
current strong labor market that offers citizens
other employment opportunities, and the levels
of education and physical fitness required for
military service, many citizens are either unwilling or unqualified to serve, and noncitizens
could help fill the gap. Expansion of the MAVNI
program would both increase overall enlistment
and attract more soldiers able to fill critical language, health-care, and, potentially, computerrelated positions.

B.

Establish Efficient Vetting Procedures and
Timeframes

Noncitizens should be vetted thoroughly, but
fairly and without excessive delays. Under the
enhanced vetting standards established in 2016,
MAVNI recruits have been flagged as security
risks for arbitrary reasons such as regularly calling family members abroad.107

Multiple federal lawsuits argue that the new
vetting requirements are excessive and unfairly
applied. Specifically, the lawsuits allege that
noncitizen recruits are not sufficiently different
from U.S.-citizen soldiers to justify disproportional vetting. While the impending “foreign nexus” screening policy will purportedly apply to all
recruits with foreign ties regardless of citizenship,108 it remains to be seen whether the factors
considered risky will be any less arbitrary.
The suits also allege that DOD implemented
the new background checks knowing that the
department lacked the capacity to efficiently
process them and with the intention of discharging MAVNI recruits while they waited.109
A complaint in one of the lawsuits, amended in
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January 2019, accuses the Army of seeking to
discharge MAVNI soldiers in retaliation for suing
the government.110 In light of these allegations,
DOD should implement clear guidelines for
classifying recruits as security risks, ensure that
vetting procedures are used strictly for bona
fide national security purposes, and devote resources to processing security checks as quickly
as possible.

Even if the enhanced vetting is necessary, DOD
should take full advantage of the skills of noncitizen soldiers while their background checks
are being processed. In its ruling permitting
LPRs to ship to basic training, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California
found that DOD had failed to adequately prove
that LPRs present any more of a security risk
than their U.S.-citizen peers.111 The block on the
deployment of MAVNI recruits similarly lacks
firm rationale. While evidence of security risks
in the MAVNI program may justify enhanced vetting, there is little reason why these risks should
preclude MAVNI recruits from receiving basic
military training. If recruits were allowed to
train while waiting to be vetted, the few who ultimately fail their background checks would still
be promptly discharged before exposure to any
classified information requiring a security clearance,112 and those who ultimately pass would be
much closer to contributing to the military.

In addition to allowing MAVNI recruits to begin
basic training, DOD should seek to place noncitizen recruits in positions that use their unique
skills but that do not require U.S. citizenship or
high-level security clearances. The new statutory requirement that MAVNI recruits use their
specialized skills in the course of their “primary
daily duties” is reasonable insofar as it advances MAVNI’s purpose. But without additional
changes to the current MAVNI system, the new
requirement all but terminates the program. To
adapt to the legislative change and make the MAVNI program more effective, DOD should open
up new or existing positions to MAVNI recruits
to allow them to use their skills while they wait
for citizenship.

DOD has firmly defended its new policies in the
face of multiple lawsuits, arguing that they are
necessary to ensure national security. But seeing
no compelling evidence of a real security risk,
one federal court found that the new policies
are “likely to actually undermine that goal by
impairing military readiness.”113 The recommendations made in this section would allow
the armed forces to both minimize any security
risk that might exist while enhancing military
readiness.

VIII. Conclusion
The U.S. government has sought noncitizens for
military service throughout American history,
with the prospect of accelerated citizenship as
a primary enlistment incentive. When pressing
needs have emerged, the military has naturalized large numbers of noncitizen military
personnel or opened up military eligibility to
new groups of noncitizens. The result has been
advantageous for both the military, which has
been able to recruit enthusiastic new personnel,
and for noncitizens, who have obtained a fast
track to U.S. citizenship.
Concerns about security risks within the military are not new. Yet the way in which these
concerns are being balanced against military
needs today is unique. In the past, military policies toward noncitizens have reflected a conscious decision that the benefits of noncitizen
contributions to the war effort outweighed the
risk of sabotage or infiltration. The calculus has
been that U.S. national security can be better
safeguarded by recruiting noncitizens to help
maintain a fully staffed and highly skilled fighting force than by keeping noncitizens out.

Changes to military policy and procedures
should be made to restore the balance between
competing national security interests. Doing
so would enable the U.S. military to ensure its
internal security while also leveraging the skills
of noncitizens to advance U.S. national security
abroad.
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